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The behavioural evidence of sensorimotor activity during conceptual processing, along 
with that from neurological research, ignited the debate around the extent to which concept 
representations are embodied or amodal. Such evidence continues to fuel the debate but 
it is open to interpretation as being consistent with a variety of the theoretical positions 
and so it is possible that further, similar evidence may not lead to its resolution. In this 
paper we propose that independent value accrues from following this line of research 
through the enhanced understanding of the factors that influence agents’ conceptual 
processing of action and how this interacts with the agent’s goals in real environments. This 
approach is in line with broad principles of embodied cognition and is worthy of pursuit 
regardless of what the results may (or may not) tell us about conceptual representation. 
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 CONCEPTS AND ACTION:  
WHERE DOES THE EMBODIMENT DEBATE LEAVE US?
The embodied cognition paradigm has led to a debate around the putative 
nature of concept representation that theoretically runs through a spectrum 
of positions from the strongest claim of ‘full embodiment’ (Glenberg, 
2015; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) to ‘no need to posit embodiment at all’ 
(Goldinger, Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen, & Hout, 2016). In this debate, the term 
‘embodied’ refers to a claim that the representations we have come to refer to 
as ‘concepts’ are of a sensorimotor nature (i.e., that concept representations 
are sensorimotor representations and therefore modality-specific). This 
claim stands in contrast to long-standing beliefs, or perhaps assumptions, 
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that concepts are abstracted from modality specific experiences, and that 
the process of abstraction results in a symbolic representation of a different 
form (i.e., amodal). The supposition of a symbolic representation had 
the important advantage of rendering the topic tractable to computational 
and statistical accounts of how concepts underpin classification (e.g., Krushke, 
1992; Shin & Nosofsky, 1992). 
However, arguments around how these symbolic representations 
(including words) come to be reliably evoked by the external stimuli to which 
they refer have persisted over many years in both philosophy (Kripke, 1972; 
Putnam, 1973) and psychology (Harnad, 1990). This is despite claims by some 
that the grounding problem can easily be dismissed, or is no more an issue of 
major concern than many other similar problems in cognition (Mahon, 2015a, 
2015b; Mahon & Hickok, 2016). Drawing on support from neuroimaging 
evidence that challenged amodal representations (Damasio, 1989; Pulvermüller, 
1999), Barsalou (1999) offered an alternative theory of what happens when a 
concept is activated that obviated the need for amodal representations, proposing 
instead that concepts are “represented in the same systems as the perceptual 
states that produced them” (Barsalou, 1999, p.579). This work has since been 
considerably developed to a ‘grounded concepts theory’ which, for Barsalou 
(2016), commits to the proposal of ‘neural reuse’.
The key evidence that fuels the debate, and interpreted as supporting 
an embodied view of concepts, is that of the seemingly ‘unnecessary’ 
activation of the sensorimotor systems during tasks where previous 
explanations for performance made no reference to such networks. Much 
of this evidence centres around sensorimotor activity related to action 
(Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006; Chao & Martin, 2000; 
Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, 
& Ungerleider, 1995; Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005), 
specifically in cases when, as Mahon (2015a) puts it, “across a range of 
situations that would not seem to necessitate sensorimotor activation” (p. 172). 
The reaction to this body of evidence itself indicates that it would not have been 
widely predicted from a pre-existing understanding of concept representation. 
The issue that arises largely from this evidence is whether it calls for 
modification (or even outright rejection) of thinking of concept representations 
as amodal. 
Following from this ‘unnecessary’ activation of sensorimotor networks, 
the aim of this paper is to acknowledge the role of the debate in continuing 
to inspire research along these lines but, moreover, to make a case for 
the independent value of behavioural investigations of the circumstances 
under which the sensorimotor system ‘unexpectedly’ influences performance 
on cognitive tasks that do not obviously require action. This includes, but is 
not limited to, documenting the type of action invoked by the task and the 
way in which this may be mediated by the participants’ goals. The next 
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section will outline the key theoretical positions in the debate, after which 
a selection of behavioural studies will be presented demonstrating the type 
of task-irrelevant activity of the sensorimotor system during conceptual 
processing that has, for some, excited the debate. This material is not presented 
for the purpose of assessing its evidential value concerning concept 
representation, but because it sheds light on the conditions under which 
action knowledge has a direct (and measurable) influence in cognitive tasks 
and suggests that these conditions can be seen as mediating the influence 
of action via perceived goals.
Representing Concepts: The Debate
The substantive question addressed by the embodied concepts debate 
is “why does the sensorimotor system become active when not obviously 
required in cognitive tasks?”. One response is to theorise that concept 
representations themselves are sensorimotor in their format (embodied) and 
consequently influence any cognitive process that depends upon concepts. 
The positions in the embodied concepts debate have come to be broadly 
characterised according to the extent  to which concept representations are 
considered to be amodal or modality-specific. The ‘fully embodied’ (radical) 
position entails a commitment to the view that concepts are sensorimotor 
in format (i.e., entirely constructed from sensory-motor representations), and 
that there is no reason at all to posit any form of amodal representation. 
It seems that very few are prepared to make this strong argument. 
One of the findings that is most cited as seriously, if not fatally, 
undermining this extreme view is that it would logically follow that damage to 
the sensory-motor system would have ‘catastrophic’ effects on the individual’s 
ability to use concepts to achieve a range of tasks that involve conceptual 
processing. This does not appear to be the case and it is reported that such 
damage has minimal effect on tasks assumed to rely on the activation of 
concepts (Binder & Desai, 2011; Mahon, 2015a) suggesting that sensorimotor 
systems cannot be solely responsible for representing concepts. However, it 
can be argued that such minimal effects can be accounted for by far less 
radical positions (Binder & Desai, 2011). On the other hand, if a fully amodal 
view is adopted, then no impairment to conceptual processing should follow 
from sensorimotor damage. The other key argument for positing concept 
representation that is independent of both perception and action is to serve as 
an explanation for the distinctly human ability to engage in ‘off-line’ thinking. 
This calls for conceptual representations that support thinking in the complete 
absence of external stimuli, or any action on the part of the agent.
Positions classified as ‘interactive’ typically propose the combination 
of amodal areas and sensorimotor systems such that interaction will flow 
from the former to the latter during conceptual processing (Leshinskaya 
& Caramazza, 2016; Machery, 2016; Mahon, 2015a, 2015b; Mahon 
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& Caramazza, 2008). It is noted that in this description a move has been 
made from concept representation (i.e., the format of concepts) to conceptual 
processing (i.e., the sensorimotor activation drawn upon under task 
performance) and, as Mahon (2015b) points out, this is a crucial distinction 
that frequently goes unacknowledged. Mahon suggests that an interaction 
between amodal and sensorimotor representations is non-controversial, 
however, further argues that concepts are amodal and utilise sensorimotor 
activity during task processing as a result of spreading activation. 
In taking an interactive stance, it is quite possible to acknowledge 
the role of the sensorimotor system in conceptual processing, while 
maintaining a view of concepts being in a different representational format 
(i.e., amodal). These positions can be seen as ‘weak’ embodiment views 
of concepts, but in acknowledging the representational difference these 
positions may as well not be considered embodied at all. Such positions are, in 
Mahon’s view, not embodied in any meaningful way in as much as they do 
not dispute the amodal nature of the concept representation.
In terms of what we may refer to as a concept, Mahon (2015b) can be 
seen as adopting an ‘amodal only’ position since he emphasises the primary 
nature of the amodal component in representation when claiming that activation 
of the sensorimotor system is “subsequent to, and contingent upon semantic 
analysis of the input” (p. 422). A more explicitly extreme position is taken 
by Goldinger et al. (2016) who argue, drawing on a number of well-
established phenomena in cognitive psychology, that the entire paradigm of 
embodied cognition offers no explanatory power for many phenomena of 
interest. With respect to concepts, these authors see a theory of embodiment 
as being proposed ‘simply for the sake of embodiment’ (Goldinger et al., 
2016, p. 967).
Barsalou’s position of Grounded Concepts (2008, 2016) has been 
interpreted as proposing one of the strongest forms of embodied concepts by 
virtue of claiming ‘neural re-use’, i.e., that concepts are represented through 
reactivation of the same, modality-specific, neural patterns evoked by the 
encoding experience. In this rejection of ‘amodal’ symbols, he has been taken to 
be embracing radical embodiment (Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016) but 
‘grounded cognition’ allows for (indeed, insists upon) the need for abstraction; 
what is disputed is that ‘abstracted’ equates to ‘amodal’ (Barsalou, 2016). 
In Barsalou’s view, amodal theories are considered as the ‘default’ having 
dominated the field for many years, and when research does not fall in line 
with the embodied view they are thus described as demonstrating amodal 
concepts. This is the case even when there is no direct evidence supporting 
the amodal view of concepts.
Since the evidence that largely motivated the debate arose from 
neuroimaging techniques, it may be anticipated that these methods may 
hold the key to resolving the debate. However, it seems that advances in that 
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area are also open to interpretation. Evidence has been reported of areas of 
the brain that may serve to generalise across modality specific regions 
(Martin, 2016). These could potentially support the type of abstracted 
‘information’that virtually all positions recognise as being necessary if 
‘fully embodied’ concepts are to be rejected. These have been referred to 
as high level convergence zones or high level association areas (Binder, 
2016; Binder & Desai, 2011; Damasio, 1989), which are located in the 
inferior parietal lobe and ventral and lateral temporal lobe. These 
convergence zones are claimed to support amodal representations as patterns 
of cross-modal conjunctive representations drawing on input from a number of 
modality specific systems; these areas can capture overlapping neural patterns 
in response to stimuli and hence underpin conceptual knowledge.  They are 
not themselves, modality specific but supervene upon areas that are. In 
allowing for activation from more than one modality, these areas may 
present as candidates for amodal representations since they cannot 
presumably retain the same format as the representation. However, they 
equally can be argued to be increasingly high-level abstractions from 
modality specific streams that still retain some aspects of modality specific 
representation.
Concepts in the Service of Action
The embodied concepts debate has served to focus attention on action 
in relation to concepts and has helped to considerably extend research and 
theory away from an approach that initially focussed largely on the organisation 
and use of feature-based knowledge. Of course, assertions that concepts are 
integrally related to action or even have developed to support action, have 
long formed part of the raft of claims that constitute an embodied approach 
to cognition (Glenberg, 1997: Wilson, 2002). In this section, it is argued that 
aside from the part played by behavioural experiments in the embodied 
concepts debate, this line of experimental research draws independent value 
from identifying particular factors that expand our understanding of when 
we would expect to see action exerting significant influence on task 
performance, and when it may appear to play a comparatively small role 
compared to other parts of the conceptual system.
Contrary to an early notion of context-independent properties (Barsalou, 
1982), Barsalou (2016) highlights reasons to believe that there are no 
aspects of conceptual knowledge that are automatically activated across all 
contexts (Kemmerer, 2015; Lebois, Wilson‐Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015), 
including action (Tomasino & Rumiati, 2013). Indeed, it is clear that action 
may not be recruited and used in all experimental tasks, as its influence has 
been shown to be dependent on the task, the stimuli, and the goal instantiated 
by the participants (Borghi et al., 2007; Borghi, Flumini, Natraj, & Wheaton, 
2012; Bub & Masson, 2006). For example, Borghi et al. (2007) found 
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a congruency effect between the type of priming used (a hand showing 
a pinch or a power grasp) and objects denoting either a precision or power 
grasp, but only when participants completed a motor training phase. While 
it may be the case that the motor system is neuronally activated during 
experimental tasks, such activation does not always exert a measurable 
influence on behavioural performance. From an experimental point of view, 
it becomes important to explicitly define the circumstances under which 
action knowledge is most influential in order to gain a better understanding of 
its influence beyond the laboratory setting. 
One of the contingent issues that arises from the debate is what now 
can be thought of as ‘the concept’ of any given entity. Is the concept of 
trumpet the perceptual features; the function of being able to produce music; 
the emotion (positive or negative); the motor programme activated when 
playing (or thinking about playing); or is it to be all of these? Mahon and 
Hickok (2016) have proposed that “…there is no single notion of a concept, 
only clusters of information that are called upon in the service of the task 
at hand, and different tasks will dictate the utility of different types of 
information” (p.950). It is in this spirit that the research addressed next will 
focus on action as the ‘cluster of information’ of key interest and to consider 
when the motor system is influential during conceptual processing.  
It should be noted that the particular focus in the work to be discussed is 
on action in relation to concepts of items having concrete referents in 
the environment, having a function relevant to everyday human goals and 
that require a physical, motor-based interaction with an agent to fulfil that 
function. This may cut across the artefact/natural kind distinction in that 
most artefacts and some natural kinds (fruits, vegetables, some animals) may 
fit these criteria.
Action-Irrelevant Tasks
Neuroimaging has shown that areas of the brain related to action 
execution, namely areas of the premotor cortex, become active across 
a range of relatively ‘simple’ tasks, such as looking at pictorial stimuli or 
reading short sentences (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Canessa et al., 2008; Chao 
& Martin, 2000; Hauk et al., 2004; Martin et al., 1995; Pulvermüller et al., 
2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005). In line with this, behavioural evidence has also 
shown that action knowledge influences task performance in action-irrelevant 
tasks where recruiting of action information is not necessary to complete 
the task. In such tasks, the action is classed as ‘irrelevant’ because 
participants are not required to mimic or perform an action related to 
the stimuli used in the experiment. Tucker and Ellis (1998) demonstrated 
that objects possess ‘micro-affordances’ which facilitate action responses even 
when unnecessary task performance. In their experiment, participants were 
presented with images of objects either inverted or in the correct orientation 
266CONCEPTS AND ACTION
and responded to the orientation of the object through a key press with the left 
or right hand. The direction of the handle was manipulated (pointing to 
the left or right of the screen) and despite not being relevant for task 
performance, the participants were faster to respond when the handle was 
oriented to the congruent response hand.  In other words, when the handle of 
the objects pointed to the right participants were faster and more accurate to 
respond with the right hand; conversely, when the handle pointed to the left 
participants were faster to respond with the left hand. Tucker and Ellis take this 
to be the evidence that objects contain micro-affordances; object perception 
influences the preparation and execution of actions. Subsequent research 
supported the micro-affordance explanation of stimulus-response compatibility 
(SRC) effects when participants mimic physical actions (Ellis & Tucker, 
2000; Tucker & Ellis, 2001, 2004). However, this explanation has been 
criticised by Proctor and Miles (2014) on the basis that SRC effects cannot 
be explained through affordances and that not all SRC effects are compatible 
with the predictions of the affordance approach.  For example, Phillips and 
Ward (2002) found SRC effects when participants responded with foot 
pedals, a finding that would not be predicted by an affordance explanation. 
However, despite questions about the nature of the mechanisms involved, 
the results of Tucker  and Ellis demonstrate a clear influence of the motor 
system in behavioural tasks even when not required for the task.  
Using a different approach, a number of studies have demonstrated 
similar activation in tasks that require direct conceptual processing such as 
those frequently used in the categorisation literature (Borghi, 2004, Borghi 
et al., 2012; Iachini, Borghi, & Senese, 2008). Borghi (2004) showed that 
during property generation tasks, participants were more likely to generate 
properties of objects directly related to action when they were thought of 
in the context of direct physical interaction. The participants were given 
a series of objects and asked if they could imagine either using, building or 
seeing the objects. On seven critical objects participants were then given 
a property generation task and asked to list relevant parts of the objects. 
The protocols were analysed according to the context in which participants 
were asked to think of the objects and it was found that properties relevant 
to physical interaction were produced earlier and more frequently when 
participants were asked to think about using the objects compared to building 
or seeing. Importantly, there were no differences between the properties 
generated in the use condition and a control condition where participants 
were simply asked to perform the property generation task. In the latter 
condition, participants still produced action-based properties earlier and with 
more frequency. This would indicate that within a general context, concepts 
are intricately linked to actions given that no difference was found between 
the use and neutral conditions. These results are further supported by Iachini 
et al. (2008) who used a category sorting task demonstrating that participants 
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sorted objects based on how they are ‘gripped’ over the shape and size of 
the objects. Such results therefore show that action knowledge is influential 
in categorisation tasks, even when this is irrelevant for task performance.  
In further support of the influence of action in tasks where no physical action 
is required, Campanella and Shallice (2011) showed that action can exert 
a negative influence during picture matching. In their first experiment, they 
employed a word-to-picture matching task where participants were shown 
a word (denoting an object) followed by two object images with the task of 
identifying if the object matching the word was seen on the left or the right side 
of the screen and to answer as quickly as possible. The distractor item was 
manipulated in how it was related to the target item such that it either shared 
no relation (pincers + candle), a visual relation (pincers + compass) or 
an action relation such that the pairs were manipulated in the same manner 
(pincers + nutcracker). Participants showed a very high level of accuracy 
when the distractor shared no relation to the target. Most interesting, accuracy 
significantly decreased with a visual distractor, and decreased even more so with 
a manipulability distractor. In Experiment 2 they not only replicated the effects 
of Experiment 1, showing that a manipulable distractor decreases accuracy, 
but also showed that such distractors had a continual detrimental effect on 
performance. Participants repeated the same task as in Experiment 1, only this 
time the trials were repeated so that participants saw each pair three times. 
The results showed that, as expected, a learning effect was seen on the visual 
distractor pairs such that after three presentations accuracy had significantly 
improved from the initial presentation. However, the opposite was shown for 
the manipulable distractor pairs in that after three presentations the accuracy 
had significantly decreased compared to the initial presentation of 
the manipulable pairs. The authors explain this pattern as the continued 
activation of action having a negative effect of subsequent presentations and 
describe this as a ‘negative serial position effect’. However, it is important to 
note a confound here in the results (that can also be applied to other studies 
in this field) in that there is a large degree of perceptual overlap between 
the manipulability pairs. Therefore, while it is true that the shared action between 
the objects could explain the discrepancy, the negative effect found could be the 
result of both shared action and perceptual characteristics combined.  
Studies into language comprehension have also shown action effects on 
task performance (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Masson, Bub, & Newton-
Taylor, 2008; Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). Myung et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that action information is recruited during a lexical decision task 
(Experiment 1). In their experiment, objects shared an action based on hand 
positions and body movements for the intention of using the objects for 
their functional purpose. For example, typewriter and piano share an action 
because of the finger movements required to type or play the keys. In the 
lexical decision task, participants were aurally presented with word-word 
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and word-nonword pairs where the relation between the target and prime 
was manipulated for the congruency of action. For example, the target of 
typewriter followed the prime of either piano (action-related) or blanket 
(non-related). Participants were faster to correctly identify the target as a word 
when the prime shared an action compared to the unrelated prime. It should 
be noted at this point that, as with the criticism of Campanella and Shallice 
(2011), a typewriter and a piano share overlapping perceptual features, and 
therefore it is possible that identification was not actually based on the shared 
action properties. Furthermore, a piano and a typewriter may share a ‘generic’ 
action but such similarities are limited; both objects require a different level 
of motor-coordination to use them. These results should be interpreted with 
some caution given such confounds. 
Performing Actions
The experiments outlined above have clearly shown that even in action-
irrelevant behavioural tasks where participants are not required to perform 
a physical action, knowledge of action(s) can have a significant influence on 
task performance. In addition to this, research where participants are instructed 
to make physical actions should not be ignored here. Interference effects 
arguably provide stronger evidence of the influence of the motor system given 
that research has demonstrated differences between the intention to act 
and physically doing so (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Osiurak, Roche, Ramone, 
& Chainay, 2013; Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, van Rooji, van Dam, 
& Bekkering, 2009). 
Taylor and Zwaan (2010) demonstrated that visual presentation of objects 
can modify grasp responses. The authors presented participants with images 
of spheres and cubes at varying diameters of 4, 6, 12 and 16cm. Attached to 
the computer were two pressure bulbs with a 6cm diameter. Participants were 
instructed to depress keys to start each trial and grasp the bulb on the left if it 
was a sphere or the bulb on the right if it was a cube (counterbalanced). 
The authors predicted that if participants were influenced by the affordances 
of the objects then they should apply more pressure to the bulb when 
the visual display was smaller than the bulb itself (i.e., greater pressure for 
the 4cm image, but no difference between the 6, 12 and 16cm images). 
The results followed this prediction where participants applied more pressure 
when the image was smaller than the grasp to be made, but no difference 
was found when the image was the same size or larger than the response. 
Taylor and Zwaan further demonstrated that these effects were based on 
perceiving affordances in two follow up experiments where the compatibility 
effect was eliminated when the spheres had spikes or were labelled as 
‘planets’. Under these conditions the size of the spheres made no difference to 
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the participant’s grasp responses because they were rendered ungraspable 
based on either visual (spikes) or semantic information (planets). These 
findings are important in light of the fact that the intention to act on 
the response bulbs interacted with the conceptual processing of the stimuli, 
hence participants applied greater pressure to the ‘graspable’ spheres than 
they did not ‘non-graspable’ spikes and planets. 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) provided strong evidence for the recruitment 
of the motor system during language comprehension tasks, notably using 
sentence ‘sensibility’ judgements. In their experiment, participants listened to 
sensible and nonsense sentences where the former described concrete transfer 
actions implying directions either toward or away from the body (e.g., “Andy 
delivered the pizza to you/You delivered the pizza to Andy”) or abstract 
transfer actions (e.g., “Liz told you the story/You told Liz the story”). 
Participants responded using a box with three buttons arranged perpendicular 
to the body. The middle button was held down at the start of each trial 
and counterbalanced instructions were given for the participant to indicate 
whether the sentence was sensible or not, requiring participants to make 
physical movements either toward or away from the body. Embodied views 
predict that understanding sentences should facilitate physical responses in 
the congruent direction. The data supported this prediction; on both 
the concrete and abstract sentences, participants were faster to respond when 
the direction of movement was congruent with the action in the sentence. 
The authors term this finding as the action-sentence compatibility effect 
(ACE). This effect was replicated when participants used their non-dominant 
hand (Experiment 2A), but only when they performed a physical movement 
(Experiment 2B). In the latter experiment, participants sat poised with their 
arms arranged near or far from their body, and their index fingers resting on 
the yes/no buttons (i.e., participants did not have to make physical movements 
away or towards the body in order to respond). Under such conditions, 
the ACE was not found suggesting that the interaction between action and 
language comprehension only occurs when there is the intention to act, 
emphasising the previous distinction made that action is activated but not 
necessarily influential in behavioural tasks. 
Research on the ACE has demonstrated that it occurs not only when 
participants have to make a physical action, but when the intention to act is 
processed simultaneously alongside the sentence. Borreggine and Kaschak 
(2006) used stimuli from Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), but moderated 
whether a response cue (indicating either moving forward or backward) 
was presented at the onset or offset of the sentence. The results showed that 




onset of the sentence, and not when the cue appeared at the offset1. 
Furthermore, the ACE has been shown only when the task is self-referential 
and the sentences take on a first person perspective (“Andy delivered 
the pizza to you”) rather than a third person perspective (“Andy delivered 
the pizza to  Liz”) (De Scalzi, Rusted, & Oakhill, 2015; Schwarzkopf, 
Weldle, Müller, & Konieczny, 2011, see also Bergen & Wheeler, 2010, for 
evidence of the ACE with third person progressive sentences). Overall, 
the ACE demonstrated by Glenberg and Kaschak, and replicated by others 
(Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; De Scalzi et al., 2015; Kaschak & Borreggine, 
2008; Schwarzkopf et al., 2011) suggests that understanding language is 
grounded within action, more specifically within the intention to act. 
Different Types of Action
What is clearly important to keep in mind when designing 
experimental stimuli, is that various actions can be applied to objects 
including those linked to function and general movement. Objects can be 
described as being either conflict or non-conflict items based on whether 
the action to manipulate the object is the same as the action to functionally 
use it (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Osiurak et al., 2013). For example, objects 
such as calculator and blender require a different action to grasp them 
(clench) as they do to functionally use them (poke) and are hence referred to 
‘conflict objects’. In contrast, objects such as baseball and screwdriver 
require the same (clench) action to grasp and use them and are hence referred 
to as ‘non-conflict objects’. Jax and Buxbaum (2010) presented participants 
with both conflict and non-conflict items, instructing them to put their hand 
on the object as though they would either use the object (use-action) or pick it 
up to pass to the experimenter (grasp-action) and included the task order as 
a factor. Overall, the authors found that participants’ took significantly longer 
to initiate use-actions than to initiate grasp-actions. In addition, they found 
a significant three-way interaction between task, object and order. When 
participants were asked to put their hand on the object to grasp it there was 
no difference between the conflict and non-conflict objects when they were 
asked to perform the grasp task first. However, when they were asked to 
perform the use task first, they were then significantly slower to put their 
hands on the conflict objects than the non-conflict in the grasp phase. 
This shows that the use of the objects interfered with the later grasp task. 
1 It is noted that these results are in contrast to the work of Bub and Masson (2012) who found 
greater congruency effects when the prime was presented during the middle or at the end of the 
spoken word. Such differences can easily be explained by the nature of the experimental tasks. 
Participants in Borreggine and Kaschak’s experiment made simple movements (backwards/
forwards) whereas those in Bub and Masson’s performed more physically complex functional and 
volumetric gestures. Therefore, the presentation-priming effect may relate to the type/complexity 
of the actions performed.
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The authors define this as a ‘long-term use-on-grasp interference’ effect. 
This interference was found to exist at both the early and later stages of 
the grasp task and lasted for approximately 20 minutes (the length 
the experiment took to complete). The authors explain this as being part of 
the “race effect” (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010, p.354) between functional and 
structural information. Functional information is ‘stronger’, requiring 
activation of object property knowledge to complete the task. Whereas 
structural knowledge, not requiring such, is quicker to instantiate, hence 
“wins the race”, but dissipates quickly. 
Osiurak et al. (2013) challenged the results of Jax and Buxbaum (2010) 
on the grounds that participants were not required to perform a physical 
action, and conducted two experiments designed to replicate their findings. 
The purpose of this was to directly compare the difference between the 
intention to use an object (as in Jax and Buxbaum) and physically doing so. 
Experiment 1 replicated the results of Jax and Buxbaum in which participants 
were faster to make grasp movements to transport the object than they were 
to use them. However, the results of Experiment 2 were in direct contrast to 
this showing that the actions to use the objects were significantly faster than 
those to grasp and transport them. The authors argue that this is most likely 
caused by the fact that having to grasp and transport an object not only evokes 
information related to an object’s properties such as weight and solidity, but 
also relating to the destination such as where the experimenter’s hand was 
to receive the object. Such characteristics would not have been evoked 
in Experiment 1 since they were not needed. Clearly in Experiment 2, 
the goal of the task becomes very different as the destination (i.e., the hand of 
the experimenter) needed to be taken into consideration for task completion. 
Bub, Masson and colleagues (Bub & Masson, 2010, 2012; Bub, Masson, 
& Cree, 2008; Masson et al., 2008) have researched differences in what 
they term as functional (the action required to use an object for its intended 
purpose) and volumetric actions (manipulating an object for generic 
movement, similar in meaning to Jax and Buxbaum’s ‘structural’ 
terminology). Masson et al. (2008) demonstrated that reading sentences 
including an object noun activated information regarding how to physically 
use them. Participants were instructed to read sentences out aloud which 
included an object noun and an abstract verb (e.g., “John thought about 
the calculator”). After reading the sentence, and a delay of either 300ms or 
750ms, participants saw a prime of a hand gesture that either matched 
the functional or the volumetric action of the object. The initiation time 
was measured between onset of the prime and the time it took to mimic 
the gesture. The prediction was similar to that of the experimental work 
above: if language is embodied within actions then reading the sentences 
containing abstract verbs should facilitate congruent responses where 
the action mimicked was congruent with the actual use of the objects. At both 
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priming delays, participants were faster to mimic the functional actions when 
they were related to the objects in the sentence. This is an important finding 
in light of the fact that the sentences made no direct reference to the manual 
manipulation of the objects. Therefore, this shows that reading sentences 
activates property knowledge including action, particularly functional actions. 
When participants mimicked the volumetric actions after a 300ms delay, 
there was no difference in initiation times when the gestures were related 
or unrelated to the object. However, at the longer delay participants were 
faster to initiate the volumetric actions when they were related to the object. 
The differences found support claims that functional actions are longer 
lasting compared to volumetric actions which are relatively ‘weaker’ in 
comparison (Bub & Masson, 2010, 2012; Bub et al., 2008; Jax & Buxbaum, 
2010; Osiurak et al., 2013).  
Goals
The factors identified from the research presented above 
indicate that priming, context and the intention to act all raise 
the salience of action in task performance. Each of these can be seen as 
directing the participants’ attention to a particular goal within the 
experimental task. The influence of goals is highlighted by Pellicano, Iani, 
Borghi, Rubichi, and Nicoletti (2010) who showed participants a torch 
in either a passive (turned off) or an active (turned on) state and found 
response compatibility effects for the handle direction and the response hand 
only when shown in the active state. In this case, performance was driven by 
a goal-directed compatibility effect. 
In the real-life environments and situations, actions are most usually 
purposive and so to consider the influence of action in conceptual processing 
without taking into account the goals associated with it is to understand 
only part of the process of interest. To take a real-world example, in order 
to use a tool to achieve a goal, one must know both how to identify it within 
the environment and what to do with the object in order to fulfil its purpose 
(action). The identification of the object is sometimes a sufficient goal in its 
own right; a tool may be correctly identified from a toolbox and passed to 
someone who knows how to use it. It may also be just the first stage in the 
‘goal’ of using the object. To identify the object, certain ‘features’ (knowledge) 
must be drawn upon; most obviously perceptual, and probably most frequently, 
visual. However, knowledge of an object that is restricted to this will not allow 
the agent to fulfil a very wide range of goals in the world. Knowledge of 
functional features such as what X is used for (or, what could this tool do for 
me) will extend the usefulness of the ‘concept’ for the agent and capability for 
acting in the world will be further enhanced by knowing how to interact with 
capability for acting in the world will be further enhanced by knowing how to 
interact with the object to make it fulfil this function. While previous research 
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shows that action can aid in the initial identification process (Helbig, Graf 
& Kiefer, 2006; Helbig, Steinwender, Graf & Kiefer, 2010; Lee, Middleton, 
Mirman, Kalénine & Buxbaum, 2013; Sim, Helbig, Graf & Kiefer, 2015; 
Tucker & Ellis, 2001; Vainio, Symes, Ellis, Tucker & Ottoboni, 2008) it is 
not necessarily needed to do so, but is required in the next sub-goal of using 
the object.  There are two potential different sources to draw on in achieving this; 
the instructional ‘knowledge’ of what actions are required, and the fine-grained 
sensori-motor experience arising from personal interaction with an object 
that would allow for an agent to successfully interact with it. These are 
potentially separable; an agent may have learnt/been told how to  make an item 
work without ever having engaged in the motor routines involved in doing 
so. You may know what you need to blow a trumpet to produce a sound, but 
the sensorimotor activation as a result of the physical experience will 
inevitably differ from purely instructional information allowing knowledge 
of how to shape lips and how to ‘blow’. In the absence of the latter, 
a concept can be considered ‘impoverished’ in that it cannot service 
successful action. Patient data has shown dissociations between action 
and function knowledge that also suggests that these areas are separable 
(Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; Buxbaum, Veramonti, & Schwartz, 2000) with 
the inferior parietal cortex being associated with action and the left anterior 
temporal lobe with function (Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016).  
Primary activation of the motor cortex through interaction will therefore 
add to conceptual knowledge that allows the agent to successfully make use 
of real world items to achieve goals. None of these claims are perhaps novel, 
but taking into consideration the specific role of distinguishable ‘clusters of 
information’ that are active in conceptual processing in relation to goals, may 
become crucial for behavioural researchers to better understand the many 
cognitive processes that have been believed to rely upon ‘concepts’. Leshinskaya 
and Caramazza (2016) suggest the neurological underpinnings of purpose 
and goals may be located in areas associated with non-sensory motor concepts. 
These areas represent similarity in function across object categories as defined 
by a conceptually related outcome and suggest themselves as supporting 
the process of “selecting and using objects and movements to achieve goals” 
(Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016, p.998). Interestingly, these could present 
as areas likely to be active in the creation of goal-directed, or ad hoc, categories 
created ‘on the fly’, the members of which do not necessarily share many 
perceptual attributes (Barsalou, 1983) but are commonly used in everyday 
problem-solving situations. For example, finding an alternative to wedge 
a door open if a door-stop was not available (e.g., anything heavy and 
relatively ‘unmoveable’ – brick, rock), coming together under the new category 
of “things to hold a door open with”.
Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, and Smith (2001), as strong proponents of 
embodied cognition, have claimed that “cognition depends [emphasis added] 
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on the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with particular 
perceptual and motor capacities” (p. 1). This could more specifically be applied 
to concepts in that having a ‘full concept’ that supports action in the world 
depends upon having a body with these same capacities. Hence, whilst 
‘catastrophic’ damage to conceptual processing may not be seen in patients 
with impairment to the motor system on certain tasks in laboratory sessions, 
their ability to engage successfully with items in the environment could be 
considered to be more than minimally damaged. There is often talk of ‘rich’ 
concepts but less consideration is given to the real-life implications of 
an impoverished concept. 
Conclusions 
The focus of the discussion above has been on action in relation to 
concepts that have a function relevant to everyday human goals and that 
require a physical, motor-based interaction with an agent to fulfil that function. 
The behavioural work that has been presented can be drawn together to 
demonstrate how the intention to act, (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Taylor 
& Zwaan, 2010), physical priming (Iachini et al., 2008; Masson et al., 2008 
Osiurak et al., 2014) and context (Borghi, 2004; Campanella & Shallice, 
2010) influence action during a range of cognitive tasks. It has been 
suggested that these factors can be perceived by participants as setting 
goals within the experiments.
The continued search to identify factors that predict when, and to what 
extent the engagement of the sensorimotor system will affect conceptual 
processing, of course, creates a potentially ‘messy’ set of variables that 
presents a challenge to experimental methods that seek isolation of specific 
causes in mainly artificial settings (as has often been the methodological 
approach to studying concepts and categorisation). As a variable, goals are 
extremely hard to control or manipulate experimentally in a manner that 
may capture their influence in everyday thought, not least because of their 
hierarchical nature and the relationship between sub-goals. Goals are therefore 
seldom intentionally manipulated, and within most behavioural experiments 
the goal that is (presumably) instantiated by the participants is an overarching 
one, such as (i) completing the task, (ii) doing it ‘right’, and (iii) doing it, 
possibly, for material gain (e.g., payment, course credits). When ‘action’ is 
described as ‘task-dependent’, what this may mean is that it is dependent on 
the goal that the participants perceive to have been set for them. 
What, then, can be drawn from the embodiment debate with regard to 
action? The accumulation of evidence for sensorimotor activity during 
tasks that do not appear to require any physical action related to 
the stimulus is likely to continue to fuel the debate concerning the nature of 
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conceptual representations. It is suggested here that without requiring resolution 
of the representation debate, investigation of the relative influence of action 
under differing circumstances may (and should) proceed meaningfully 
with a view to documenting the factors that determine when action is most 
likely to play a role in explaining cognitive performance. Neuroscience is 
rapidly supporting a picture of a complex and integrated conceptual system 
with areas that have the facility for drawing across a range of modalities 
(Binder, 2016; Binder & Desai, 2011; Damasio, 1989).  Although this 
is open to theoretical interpretation, it directs behavioural researchers to 
continue to broaden their focus of investigation to include separable factors 
that have perhaps been hitherto recognised but accounted for under the broad 
umbrella of ‘context’; we have particularly argued for the importance of 
understanding the role of goals.
Whilst the value of the results from this line of research may, or may not, 
ultimately be helpful in resolving the debate around the modality of concept 
representations, taking action (and its relation to other variables) to be a key 
contributor to conceptual processing may enhance the chances of achieving our 
own goal of extending understanding of cognition beyond the laboratory.
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